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Introduction
Virtually all European borders areas are involved in some type of cross-border region (CBR). Today, there are more than seventy such arrangements in Europe, usually operating under names such as 'Euroregions' or 'Working Communities'.
Although CBRs have a long tradition in post-war Western Europe (O'Dowd, 2003) , the 1990s saw a large increase all over Europe.
Among the various models, 'Euroregions' have certainly received most recent attention in policy practice, mostly because they fit the organisational and spatial requirements of the EU support programme for CBRs. As opposed to the larger, multi-regional Working Communities that often spread over several countries, Euroregions are small-scale groupings of contiguous public authorities across one or more nation-state borders and can be referred to as 'micro-CBRs' (Perkmann, 2003) .
Are Euroregions a new type of region, spanning national borders and creating cross-border territories? As such, they would insert themselves into the wider tendencies of 'rescaling' and 'reterritorialisation' theorised by various observers (Blatter, 2001; Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 1999) . At the same time however, others have emphasised the patchy track record of European CBRs, both in terms of institution-building as well as their actual impact on local cross-border environments (Beck 1997; Church and Reid 1999; Liberda 1996; Scott 1998; Sidaway 2001) . Even the European Commission -the main sponsor of many of these collaboration initiatives -accepts that it has generally been difficult to induce genuine cross-border collaborative projects (O'Dowd, 2003) . Against this background, the apparently even proliferation of Euroregions across the EU warrants some further investigation. This paper pursues two objectives. Firstly, it aims to establish that there is great variation across different cases of Euroregions particularly in relation to the degree to which they have established themselves as independent organisational actors. Secondly, it explores the institutional conditions across different countries that facilitate such an organisational emancipation of Euroregions.
For the first objective, I use the concept of policy entrepreneurship as an analytical lens for capturing variation. The concept provides a tool to assess to what degree Euroregions represent actual actors able to shape their environment.
It thereby makes it possible to discriminate between Euroregions which have achieved a certain capacity to act and those which are mere ceremonial envelopes or administration vehicles for EU programmes.
The analysis is set against the background of the EU multi-level governance system that provides opportunities for new types of policy actors to appropriate policy competencies and resources in an entrepreneurial fashion. It assumes that for CBRs to have an impact as independently constituted actors, they require an organisational basis, complemented by the capability to mobilise a resource stream to fuel the enactment of cross-border strategies and related interventions.
Although some contributions have addressed differences between Europe and
North America (Blatter, 2001; Brunet-Jailly, 2004 ), a systematic comparison of Euroregions has been largely missing from the literature. A comparative case study approach can be seen as complementary to quantitative work on the proliferation and forms of European CBRs (Perkmann 2003) .
To address the second objective, the paper explores the factors behind the uneven development of local cross-border relationships across the European Union. The paper is organised as follows: First, I provide an overview on the specificities of European CBRs. Second, I introduce a framework that conceptualises crossborder regions within wider developments in the European polity and builds on the ideas of policy entrepreneurship and resource mobilization. The third section discusses the methods used and provides brief overviews on the single cases: the EUREGIO, the Viadrina and the Tyrol. The case study evidence is then compared across the cases by using operational criteria provided by the policy entrepreneurship framework. The conclusion synthesises the results and identifies the facilitating factors behind successful cases of CBC.
Cross-border regions, the European experience

Characteristics of European cross-border regions
European CBRs represent policy-driven rather than market-driven cases of local cross-border integration. This distinction can be made against the background of the main drivers of cross-border integration processes. In this respect, two main integration scenarios can be distinguished:
(a) Market-driven integration: based on the proliferation and/or reactivation of social or economic relationships. Such processes of cross-borderisation can often be found to predominate in case of persisting borders where highly accentuated cross-border differentials stimulate strong cross-border activity, for instance in terms of factor costs such as labour. Examples are provided by 'Greater China' (Sum, 2002) or the US-Mexican border (Scott, 1999) ; in each of these cases, market-driven integration processes were induced by the declaration of Special Economic Zones.
(b) Policy-driven integration: based on the building of co-operative relationships between public and other bodies that share certain interests, such as coping with environmental interdependencies or creating cross-border economic spaces. These networks often emerge in response to the failures of central state authorities, with local and regional actors exploiting the new opportunity structures created by regionalisation and globalisation. Examples are provided by most European CBRs but also 'compensatory' meso-level networks that emerge as a reaction to the interdependencies or negative externalities created by market-driven cross-border integration, such as on the US-Mexican border (Scott, 1999) .
European CBRs can be largely characterized as policy-driven focused on the building of meso-level cross-border policy institutions. This applies in particular to micro-CBRs -or Euroregions in common parlance -which are institutionally the most developed type of CBR in Europe.
In practice, such CBRs are defined by three characteristics (Perkmann, 2003) .
First, they belong to the realm of public agency, with their protagonists being contiguous sub-national public authorities on local, district or regional levels from two or more countries. Many CBRs emerged as a result of the stabilisation of cross-border contacts over time, involving a de-facto institutionalisation of governance structures, decision-making mechanisms and distribution rules.
Secondly, CBRs are often based on informal or 'quasi-juridical' arrangements among the participating authorities. This is because subnational authorities are usually not allowed to agree international treaties with foreign authorities. Third, in substantive terms, CBRs are foremost concerned with practical problemsolving in a broad range of fields of everyday administrative life; these tend to be local policy areas with a perceived need for policy co-ordination or the management of cross-border interdependencies. In this respect, nearly all CBRs are concerned with implementing measures funding by the EU programme Interreg (cf. below) which include such diverse fields as SME support, technology and innovation, education and culture, labour market, spatial planning and the environment.
Organisationally, many Euroregions have a council, a presidency, subject-matter oriented working groups and a secretariat. Thus, the term 'CBR' refers to both a territorial unit, made up of the aggregate territories of participating authorities, and an organisational entity, usually the secretariat or management unit. In most cases, the participating bodies are local authorities, although sometimes regional or district authorities are involved. Occasionally, other organisations, such as regional development agencies, interest associations and chambers of commerce also participate in the governance of the CBR. The spatial extension of microCBRs will usually range between 50 and 100km in width; and they tend to be inhabited by a few million inhabitants.
European CBC: history and supranational policy context
The first formal CBR, the EUREGIO, was established in 1958 on the DutchGerman border, shortly followed by a number of initiatives along the Rhine basin, notably the Regio Basiliensis around Basel (Speiser 1993) . Today municipalities, districts and regional authorities in more than seventy locales co-operate with their counterparts via a variety of organisational arrangements.
Crucially, this process was facilitated by supranational institutions, such as the 
Euroregions and policy entrepreneurship
Interreg is by far the most important source of funding for most micro-CBRs, raising the question whether these initiatives exist only because this type of resource is available. In that case, they would qualify as hardly more than 'grant coalitions' (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell 1996) (Smyrl 1997) ; in this sense, their ability to mobilise funding could be interpreted as success.
In this section, I suggest a way of going beyond the binary choice between 'instrumental' and 'genuine' collaboration by offering a framework that can discriminate between different cases. This builds on ideas derived from the new institutionalism in political and organisational analysis (March and Olsen 1984) that conceive policy developments in the context of institutional constraints and opportunities. Specifically, the concept of policy entrepreneurship is used to understand the emergence of policy organisations in contexts of relative openness that characterise the operation of European cross-border regions.
Euroregions, multi-level governance and state re-structuring
Empirically speaking, the distinction between instrumental and genuine cooperation motives is difficult to operationalise. It appears more appropriate to focus on outcomes rather than on the more intangible imputed motives for establishing CBRs. Among various possible outcome criteria, this paper makes a conscious choice to focus on organisation-building as a main indicator and outcome of successful co-operation. Euroregions are evaluated as to whether they succeeded in establishing themselves as functioning organisations with some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the participating member authorities on both sides of the border. This criterion allows us to distinguish between co-operation arrangements based on relatively independent organisations and 'committee cooperation' in which decision-making is limited to distributing EU funds as opposed to producing specific and enduring cross-border effects (Beck, 1997) .
It should be noted that the focus on organisation-building is one step removed from assessing whether they are effective in furthering economic or social crossborder integration. This choice is based on the assumption that functioning crossborder organisations are more likely than ad-hoc committees to induce crossborder integration as this becomes their organisational mission and basis of survival. The choice is also reinforced by the lack of comparative data on local cross-border integration.
More importantly, an organisational view of Euroregions resonates with a number of themes in the broader literature on European integration and the trends affecting the nation state. On the first theme, the recent literature sheds light on the multi-level governance structures emerging particularly within EU regional policy (Hooghe, 1996; Benz and Eberlein, 1999) . This literature is primarily concerned with the impact of Cohesion Policy on territorial organisation in the EU Member States, with an explicit focus on the involvement of regional authorities in decision-making at various stages of the policy process.
Given the interdependence of national and sub-national actors, the European polity can be seen as an interconnected system of non-nested political arenas in which the boundaries between domestic and international politics are increasingly blurred (Marks, 1996) . Although the formal sovereignty of the Member States is retained, it is claimed that the unilateral control of states over their territories de facto continues to erode (Conzelmann 1998: 5) .
Within this scenario, Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue that a new type of territory has come to complement the traditional type of non-intersecting and nested territory. Such 'type II governance' involves task-specific jurisdictions, intersecting membership and flexibly designed competencies and intervention mechanisms (ibid.). It is easy to see why Euroregions can be seen in this way as an example for such type II structures. They focus on cross-border policy co-ordination as their specialist task, they involve members drawn from various different jurisdictions and are flexibly designed to respond to their policy mandate. It follows that organisation-building will be an essential part of the emergence of such type II governance structures.
The focus on organisation-building is reinforced by the specific characteristics of the European policy space. The EU is an atypical policy maker in that it has no implementation agency. It relies on the member states and their subordinate authorities to execute policy. Despite its weak formal powers, however, the EU has a remarkable impact because the procedural requirements laid out in the regulations give the Commission a considerable say over the substantive content of policies. The Cohesion Policy regulations provide various incentives for agency co-operation and co-ordination and hence the creation of policy networks (Heinelt and Smith, 1996) . For instance, in many programmes the Commission requires subnational actors to be involved in policy implementation. The 'partnership principle' functions as an effective intervention instrument that allows the Commission to exert influence at all stages of the policy process, i.e.
initiation, policy design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (Tömmel, 1994) . The requirement of unanimity ensures that decision-making in the implementation networks relies on consensus-driven bargaining which provides a favourable context for effectiveness-oriented administrative action (Heinelt 1996: 298) as opposed to 'horse-trading' over (re)distributive issues. It is in this networked, multi-level policy space, that policy opportunities arise for specialist, type II governance actors who support the European Commission in implementing policies.
This trend towards type II governance can be read against the context of broader tendencies affecting statehood as outlined by Jessop (2004) . On one hand, the 'denationalisation' of statehood involves the shifting of state powers upwards to supranational bodies and down to regional or local states, or even networks of regional or local states. On the other, the retreat of the state implies a shift from 'government to governance' towards self-organising networks of public agency.
This 'weakening of territorial "power containers" […] relative to non-territorial forms of political power that are formally independent of state borders' (ibid.) refers precisely to the formation of type II governance units. Jessop (2002) details some implications of these processes for the rescaling of territories. In any case it can be assumed that such tendencies indicate the requirement that non-central state agencies build organisational capacity to pursue public and semi-public governance functions. The next section develops a more detailed framework for analysing such organisation-building processes.
A framework for comparing Euroregions
The preceding arguments describe a context that provides an opportunity space for actors capable of assuming policy tasks and attracting resources to execute them. This will almost certainly involve the creation and development of relatively durable and autonomous organisations. In this section, I suggest that the concept of policy entrepreneurship can be used to capture this process. Two bodies of literature are used: work on policy entrepreneurship, and work on resource mobilisation within the context of organisations and social movements.
Within the literature on policy innovation (Mintrom, 1997) , policy entrepreneurs are characterised as actors who position themselves as protagonists within specific policy areas by taking advantage of windows of opportunity opened up by conjunctures within their policy environment. Reflecting the 'garbage can model' of organisational choice (Cohen et al 1972) , they are in constant search for possible problems for which they can offer a solution (Kingdon 1984; Majone and Tame 1996; Mintrom and Vergari 1996) . They do this not necessarily for financial profit but to increase the influence of their organisation or organisational unit which is often correlated to their resource basis.
Recent research on EU policy formation has applied the concept of policy entrepreneurship to the European Commission (Laffan, 1997; Moravcsik, 1999 ).
The Commission is described as a policy agent capable of entrepreneurially exploiting the resources at its disposal in order to generate new policies that are acceptable to various coalitions of member states.
By way of analogy the concept can be applied, with some modifications, to
Euroregions. Brouard (1996) , for instance, analyses the construction of the Atlantic Arc -a Working Community at the Western fringes of the European Union from the UK to Portugal -as a 'political enterprise'. Although not using the notion of policy entrepreneurship, Carmin et al. (2003) show that the emergence of the White Carpathian Euroregion was shaped by environmentally oriented NGOs seizing an opportunity structure which in turn had been created by changes within their national political systems and the availability of European
Union support.
For current purposes, I propose to amend these notions of political entrepreneurship in two respects. Firstly, while the notion is often applied to theorise individual agency, i.e. the strategies of entrepreneurial individuals (Kingdon, 1984) , I apply the notion to activities and strategies of Euroregions as organisations. In recent work, political scientists have suggested that it is not always possible to trace policy innovation back to individuals but that it needs to be attributed to collectives (Roberts and King, 1996) .
Secondly, and following from the last point, strategies to exploit windows of opportunities will be accompanied by a process of organisation-building. As with any other organisation, once a Euroregion is established as such, it will operate to secure organisational survival (McCarthy and Zald, 1977 ). This will occur within the constraints and opportunities afforded by the organisation's ability to mobilise resource and the specialist competencies it will be able to build up over time.
Though mostly applied to social movements, resource mobilisation theory can hence be used to inform an operational framework to assess the success of Euroregions. In particular, it refers to the ability of these organisations to create and maintain a support base on a local level; in most cases, this will involve maintaining networks of local authorities as paying members. that the availability of EU funding provides selective incentives (Olson, 1965) for municipalities to shoulder the cost of participation in return for
Interreg project funding -which could be indicative for purely 'instrumental' participation -it can be postulated that successful
Euroregions will attempt to broaden their resource base to encompass other, more diversified sources.
Appropriation of Cross-border co-operation (CBC) activities: Successful
Euroregions establish themselves as important players within the overall context of cross-border strategies in a given border area. Such strategies may be pursued by other public or semi-public authorities, commercial entities or civil society organisations. Successful CBR organisations can be expected to appropriate or influence such CBC strategising in their area and seek to be recognised as legitimate and competent by other players.
In the following section, these criteria are applied to the case studies to capture the variance of CBR initiatives.
Comments on methods and cases
A comparative case study approach is used to substantiate the claims advanced above (Eisenhardt, 1989) . For each case, qualitative evidence was collected, providing the depth of analysis to allow a detailed understanding of the logic of each case. At the same time, the comparative dimension enabled a schematic differentiation of the features that were at the centre of the present investigation.
Theoretical sampling was applied for selecting the cases. This means cases were selected on the basis of expected differences that would allow the highlighting of 
The EUREGIO
The EUREGIO is one of four Dutch-German CBRs. It has a population of approx. 
The Viadrina
The The foundation of the Viadrina in 1993 followed the breakdown of the Socialist bloc and German re-unification. Socio-economically, its environment is characterised by strong border differences between the East German and Polish economies generated by radical structural and institutional changes on the German side in the 1990s. Until very recently -i.e. Poland's EU accession -the Viadrina cut through the external EU-border as the German parts were EU territory while the Polish areas were not. Hence only German border areas were eligible for EU Interreg support while the Polish part depended on centrally administered funding from the Polish government.
There were two key motives for establishing the Euroregion. The initial desire to establish neighbourly relationships originated in civil society circles on the German side. A foundation, the 'Frankfurt Bridge' was established whose objective was to contribute to German-Polish 'reconciliation' after the re-opening of the border. Almost simultaneously the local authorities, particularly on the German side, were made aware of the prospective availability of EU Interreg funding for CBC. This was also a strong driver for a local co-operation initiative.
The process was supported by the Land Brandenburg which under German legislation is responsible for the implementation of EU regional policy programmes and hence had a strong interest in establishing administrative structures suitable for deploying Interreg funding in its border areas. Ultimately, this meant that the organisational form to be chosen for establishing a CBR was going to be a 'Euroregion' -adopting the successful model of the EUREGIO and other mature CBRs -and not a foundation as originally proposed by the civil society actors.
The Euroregion Tyrol
The Tyrol Euroregion has a population of approx. 1.5m and involves the provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol (Italy) and the Land Tirol (Austria) with
Trento, Bolzano and Innsbruck as the main centres. Here, the motivation for creating the Euroregion 3 differs entirely from the other two cases. It is an example of a CBR embedded in an ethnic minority context (Luverà 1996) . The Germanspeaking southern part of the previous Tyrol County was ceded to Italy after World War I while the Northern part remained with the newly constituted Austrian Republic. It is no surprise that the building of a CBR in this case invoked the common cultural and ethnic heritage of the German-speaking populations in both countries as a common overarching territorial identity, a component largely missing from the other cases.
Politically, the post-war history of South Tyrol is characterised by the struggle for 'self-determination' pursued by the main German-speaking forces. This struggle was successful insofar as an 'autonomous' constitutional status was obtained in 1991 after decade-long negotiations with the Italian central government.
Although cross-border co-ordination and collaboration had been pursued for most of the post-war period, the establishment of a Euroregion as a formal platform was initiated only in the 1990s. As opposed to the EUREGIO and Viadrina, the Tyrol Euroregion does not involve any municipalities or other lower-tier authorities.
While in the two former cases the establishment of CBRs resulted from a process of bottom-up regional mobilisation involving a large number of authorities, the Tyrol Euroregion is based on an agreement between a small number of established regional authorities. 
Discussion: Comparing Euroregions
Organisation development
The first element of policy entrepreneurship refers to the degree to which
Euroregions have established an organisational basis. Apart from the mere organisational size, this concerns, on one hand the relative autonomy they have achieved within the local and vertical networks of public authorities concerned with cross-border policies and on the other, whether or not they have widened their range of activities by taking on related tasks and competencies within their context.
Among the three cases, the EUREGIO secretariat developed the most advanced organisational capability with approx. thirty employees. Although it acted on behalf of more than 140 local authorities, the EUREGIO was not a public authority, at least not as a cross-border unit. This means, inter alia, that the secretariat had no formal competencies nor any guaranteed income streams. Thus the range of tasks assumed by the EUREGIO, and in particular its secretariat, was relatively undefined. This enabled the secretariat to act in an entrepreneurial fashion as long as it had the backing of the member authorities and this relative discretion in defining and expanding its tasks was widely used.
Informants from involved local and central-state authorities acknowledged that the secretariat exerted considerable informal influence on EU programme implementation based on its expertise and local connectedness. On one hand, it acted as a project animator, it ensured that all available funds were allocated and turning initial ideas into project applications ready for submission to the Steering Committee (iE6). A senior NRW official observed: '… you can't pull projects like a rabbit out of a hat', implying that the higher-level authorities relied on the EUREGIO in this respect (iE11). On the other hand, it made itself indispensable as a network broker. For genuine cross-border projects, project applicants needed partners on the other side of the border and these relevant contacts were usually established by the secretariat (iE7).
The EUREGIO also managed secretariats for related associations, such as the Interreg Steering and Monitoring Committees, a Dutch-German cultural commission, a socio-economic advisory council, a forum of Belgian-Dutch-
German Euroregions and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR).
The development of the Viadrina as an organisation, by contrast, was more limited. Although the Viadrina's headquarters was formally in Poland, the secretariat had separate German and Polish sections of which the larger was in Frankfurt/Oder with approx. eight staff. In terms of its role, the secretariat's activities were essentially confined to administering the deployment of Interreg funds. Compared to the EUREGIO, the Viadrina secretariat had less impact on decision-making relating to the funding of cross-border projects. This was partly to do with the fact that for most of its history Interreg funding was only available to the German side.
EU support from another programme (Phare) was available for the Polish Areas but the administrative separation proved a barrier to effective cross-border projects and decision-making mechanisms were complex and unwieldy (Grix and Knowles, 2003 In the Tyrol case a different situation prevailed. In an early attempt in the 1990s, the three participating regional authorities sought to institute the Euroregion as a formal authority recognised by public law in both countries (Toniatti 1997: 32) .
However, facing local and national opposition fuelled by nationalist, legal and sovereignty-related concerns, the project was abandoned and replaced by a collaboration agreement that remained short of establishing a common secretariat.
In this situation, the Euroregion remained a largely symbolic envelope rather than an operational organisation with a coherent strategy. The small secretariat established in the Italian city of Bolzano in the early 2000s acted mainly as a public relations outlet rather than an active driver of cross-border activities. The Euroregion Tyrol also lacked the representational and decision-making bodies seen in the other cases. Decisions on cross-border projects were taken at yearly conferences that brought together representatives from the three member authorities, strongly influenced by their executive branches (iT6).
Of the cases considered, the EUREGIO has the most developed organisational capacity This is reflected in its number of employees and the discretion in crossborder matters it is awarded by higher-level authorities. The opposite scenario is represented by the Tyrol Euroregion where organisational capacity is only embryonically developed and decisions are therefore made by committees while the Viadrina occupies an intermediate position.
Diversification of resource base
The second criterion refers to the degree to which Euregional organisations have diversified their resource base away from exclusive reliance on Interreg.
The EUREGIO's standing was reflected in its ability to generate a stable resource flow to maintain its operations. It had considerable income from sources not related to Interreg, notably from a membership fee charged to the member authorities, EUR .29 per inhabitant at the time of writing. 4 The secretariat proved rather successful in raising project-related funding long before Interreg was launched. In most cases, local funds were complemented by contributions from NRW and the European Commission. For instance, a cultural commission ('Mozer Commission') was funded separately from various regional and national sources in both countries. More recently, the secretariat bid successfully for pilotprojects from the European Commission. Among others, the EUREGIO managed a 'EURES-T' unit concerned with labour market issues, a consumer advice centre and a 'Euro-Info-Center' for SMEs. As a result, the secretariat operated a range of activities that strengthen its profile as cross-border regional advice and citizen's service centre.
The Viadrina also charged a membership fee to member authorities but its resource stream was more narrowly dependent on proceeds from Interreg 'technical assistance'. These are the funds allocated to local agencies to cover the costs of the administration of Interreg, as opposed to those available to project applicants for cross-border projects which constitute the majority of EU funding.
The EUREGIO managed to obtain a larger share of those latter funds available compared to the Viadrina by being a project applicant and owner itself. This further increased the EUREGIO's resource position and promoted its organisation-building efforts.
Given the low profile of the Tyrol Euroregion as an organisation, the question of resource base diversification does not apply. It is significant, however, that this Euroregion is not involved in the implementation of Interreg and is hence not funded by Interreg technical assistance. One reason for this is that the area designated for Interreg support by the European Commission does not exactly correspond to the territories of the co-operating regional authorities. In addition, the participating authorities do not depend on Interreg for running a Euroregion as, compared to the municipalities in the EUREGIO and Viadrina cases, these are regional authorities for whom the material contribution of Interreg funding is small.
Among the three cases, the EUREGIO secretariat has gone furthest in diversifying its resource base although Interreg still constitutes by far the largest share of income. Even at this level, however, the EUREGIO's efforts differentiate it from the Viadrina which relies almost exclusively on Interreg technical assistance. Due to its embryonic status, the criterion is not applicable at all to the Tyrol Euroregion.
Appropriation of cross-border activities
The final criterion suggested by the policy entrepreneurship framework refers to the degree to which Euroregional organisations appropriate cross-border policy activities within their area. This section therefore assesses the extent to which
Euroregions were involved as protagonists or at least participants in other policy activities aimed at promoting cross-border integration in their areas.
The EUREGIO appeared to have established itself as a highly regarded regional development agency in the Dutch-German border area: 'In our [geographic] area, cross-border co-operation is automatically associated with the EUREGIO' (iE6).
Beyond being an implementation unit acting on behalf of the European Commission and the involved member states, the EUREGIO had become the undisputed reference point for all 'cross-border issues' in the local environment and was recognised as such by the local authorities on both sides of the border:
'[The EUREGIO] has become a natural part of the day-to-day administrative life' (iE9, similar iE12) .
This status as regional development agency for a cross-border space was reflected in the ambitions of its functionaries. The objective was the transformation of the cross-border area into a 'central location in North-West Europe' (Gabbe, 1985: 95) . Policy frameworks inspired by the idea of a homogenous region have existed since the early stages of the EUREGIO. The vision of a 'functional unit in all spheres of life' between the Dutch Randstad and the German Ruhr originated in the late sixties, if not earlier (CoE, 1972: 111) . The development of such visions can be seen as important in constituting a strategic envelope for the organisationbuilding strategies of the EUREGIO.
The EUREGIO's appropriation of Interreg implementation before the programme was launched illustrates its entrepreneurial capability to exploit policy opportunities. In the 1980s, member municipalities agreed to increase their financial contribution in the expectation that this would help secure a substantial local impact on the allocation of future European funding (iE5). The EUREGIO hence grasped a strategic opportunity when it was still undecided whether a largescale CBC support programme would be launched by the European Commission.
The result was that when Interreg was finally launched, with fifteen staff members the EUREGIO secretariat was the natural candidate for the management of the programme in its area: '… the EUREGIO was already there, it was obvious that they were going to do the programme management.' (iE1).
In comparison, the Viadrina's remit was limited to administering Interreg funds and it failed to be a relevant player in a number of other policy initiatives targeted at the German-Polish border space. Various commentators have noted that the Euroregion failed to deliver on the inflated expectations it nurtured in the initial period (Grix and Knowles, 2003; Scott, 1998) . For the initiation of these activities preceded the Euroregion, it had no legitimate prerogative to take over the co-ordination of cross-border measures when it was established. Notably, the administration of Interreg was not transferred to the Euroregion (as an organisation) but continued to be carried out in conjunction with other EU programmes by the responsible administrative units of the participating authorities. This is despite the fact that many of these projects were criticised even by the policy implementers themselves as they had little genuine cross-border content (iT6). Some Interreg projects were devolved to deconcentrated branches of the regional administrations located in the immediate border areas. These units were historically involved in other EU-funded programmes, such as LEADER, and hence had the required expertise (iT5).
It can be concluded that the impact of the Euroregion as an organisation on the CBC landscape in Tyrol is small. The Euroregion Tyrol is a largely symbolical project promoted by the political leaders of the three regions whereas the practical aspects appear marginal. This Euroregion, therefore, is qualitatively different from the EUREGIO that was constituted through a bottom-up process of regional mobilisation with strongly pragmatic features.
Conclusions
The use of the concept of policy entrepreneurship as a framework for analysis By contrast, the Viadrina is a latecomer and -in an act of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 ) -adopted a readily available organisational model.
For the German local and Land authorities, the purpose of the Euroregion was to have a vehicle to deploy EU Interreg funds in the border area. The effective regional mobilisation -establishing collective action capacity among local actors -was less pronounced than in the EUREGIO, and higher-level authorities, such as the central state and regional authorities, retained stronger control. This discussion suggests CBRs are more likely to be effective in countries with a strong tradition of municipal autonomy. In the German system, the two-level structure of local authorities -consisting of the municipalities on one hand and district-type aggregations of municipalities (Kreise) on the other -facilitates collective action among municipalities. The (West) German Länder have historically developed a benevolent attitude towards inter-municipal co-operation in general and to CBRs in particular, as this was seen as a way to decentralise the implementation of local regional policies (Voelzkow, 1995) .
In this context, the autonomy gained by the Euroregions has allowed them to engage in policy entrepreneurship, exploit windows of opportunities related to the cross-border theme and build organisational competence in cross-border policies -as seen in the case of the EUREGIO. Their ability to assert themselves as small, specialised Interreg implementation units -with major implications for their resource base -is one of the foremost examples of this.
Although both are involved in Interreg, differences remain between the EUREGIO, which emerged as a grass roots movement long before Interreg funds were available, and the Viadrina where the availability of Interreg was a major rationale for adopting the form of a Euroregion for creating a CBR. The EUREGIO's more diversified resource base, organisational capacity and legitimacy within the local environment are in stark contrast to the Viadrina whose role is mostly limited to administering Interreg and which has failed to assert itself as a strategic actor in cross-border matters.
The results confirm the broader analyses of 'multi-level governance' policy structures which argue that European regional policies are implemented within complex vertical integration networks exhibiting strong variation across member
states. This article has added a micro-perspective on the modalities of agency and strategy formation at the grass roots level; it postulates that policy entrepreneurship and organisation-building are among the main mechanisms for generating durable local action in the multi-level governance framework.
If one agrees that these are desirable characteristics of policy implementation, one can use the conceptual components of policy entrepreneurship to generate a set of success criteria for cross-border regions or similar initiatives. Equally, the framework can inform some of the variables for further, quantitatively oriented research evaluating success or failure of a larger number of Euroregions.
On the broader question as to whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new type of regional territory (cross-border regions), the answer is two-fold: Firstly, the degree to which genuine cross-border agency is established across local crossborder spaces varies strongly, dependent primarily on the territorialadministrative context and specific local conditions for the emergence of such policy entrepreneurship. This comparative case study analysis has shown that in some cases Euroregions represent hardly more than paper tigers while in others one can see the embryonic emergence of cross-border regional governance structures linked to a cross-border agency.
Secondly, even in those cases where cross-border agency has been successfully institutionalised, it appears premature to attribute the characteristics of a 'region' to these entities. Although they assume pseudo-territorial features, and engage in strategies of cross-border identity building invoking territorial imaginaries, their relative dimensions in terms of organisational size and resource control are still small compared to the established public authorities on either side of the border (Perkmann, 2007) . Rather, they constitute an institutional form through which existing authorities engage in collective action across nation-state borders. We need to regard Euroregions as part of the dynamic policy innovation scenario induced by EU integration rather than as new territorial entities strictly speaking. 
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